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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 10-1753 
___________ 
 
JOHN MALUDA, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
_______________________ 
 
 Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
 Washington, D.C. 
 Tax Court No. 26429-07  
 (U.S. Tax Court Judge:  Honorable Maurice B. Foley) 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
 May 26, 2011 
 
 Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, SCIRICA and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed:  June 23, 2011) 
_________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 John Maluda requested Innocent Spouse Relief from joint and several liability for 
underreported income on joint tax returns he filed with his wife, Cathy, between 1998 
and 2002. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied John’s request, and the Tax 
Court upheld the IRS’s decision. On appeal, John contends he was entitled to Innocent 
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Spouse Relief based on nominal ownership and misallocation of underreported income. 
We will affirm. 
I. 
 On June 11, 1994, John and Cathy Maluda married. During the taxable years 
1998-2002, John ran a tool dealership as a Schedule C sole proprietorship while Cathy 
was an unemployed homemaker. During this period, the Maludas filed joint income tax 
returns, but failed to pay taxes on John’s self-employment income. On June 26, 2006, the 
Maludas separated, and Cathy filed for divorce on December 22, 2006.  
 The Maludas filed untimely joint income tax returns for the years 1999-2002 on 
December 29, 2004, and an untimely joint return for 1998 on February 12, 2007, to 
reflect their income, almost all of which came from John’s business. On May 4, 2007, 
John filed with the IRS a Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, IRS form 8857, seeking 
relief from liability for unpaid taxes during the years 1998-2002. This form stated John 
was not responsible for the Maludas’ underpayment of taxes because Cathy had led him 
to believe she prepared and filed their joint tax returns in these years when, in fact, she 
had diverted these funds to her own use. In support of his request, John produced a 
counterfeit passbook in the Maludas’ name reflecting false deposit and withdrawal 
information from the joint bank account the Maludas held at the Valley National Bank. 
John contends Cathy fabricated this passbook to convince him she had paid their taxes. 
 On October 24, 2007, the IRS denied John’s request for Innocent Spouse Relief 
“because relief is not allowed on tax you owe on your own income or deductions.” John 
3 
 
timely filed a petition for review in Tax Court, where the parties submitted the case 
without a trial and on the basis of a stipulated record. The court agreed with the IRS that 
relief is not typically available for a taxpayer who fails to file taxes on his own income, 
but also concluded the IRS failed to consider exceptions to this rule. But the court found 
John did not meet these exceptions and upheld the IRS’s order denying his request. John 
timely appealed.
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II. 
 On appeal, John contends the Tax Court erred in finding he was not entitled to 
Innocent Spouse Relief under § 6015(f) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).
2
 Spouses 
filing joint federal income tax returns are generally jointly and severally liable for the full 
amount of tax due on their combined incomes. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3). However, § 6015 
provides several circumstances whereby a requesting taxpayer who files a joint tax return 
may qualify for Innocent Spouse Relief and be relieved of joint and several liability for 
unpaid sums. Section 6015(f) permits the Secretary of the Treasury to relieve an 
individual from joint and several liability if “taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax . . . .” 
Internal Revenue Procedures list seven conditions a requesting taxpayer must satisfy to 
                                                 
1
 The Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. §§ 6015(e)(1)(A) and 7442. We have 
jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  
2
 “Our review of the Tax Court’s legal conclusions is plenary and is based on the clearly 
erroneous standard for its findings of fact.” Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm’r, 299 F.3d 
221, 227 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Tax Court’s 
determination that a spouse is not entitled to innocent spouse relief is a finding of fact 
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be eligible for relief under § 6015(f). The only one at issue is condition 7. Condition 7 
reads, in relevant part: 
The income tax liability from which the requesting spouse seeks relief is 
attributable to an item of the individual with whom the requesting spouse filed the 
joint return (the “nonrequesting spouse”), unless one of the following exceptions 
applies: 
. . . 
(b) Nominal ownership. If the item is titled in the name of the requesting 
spouse, the item is presumptively attributable to the requesting spouse. This 
presumption is rebuttable. . . . 
(c) Misappropriation of funds. If the requesting spouse did not know, and 
had no reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax were 
misappropriated by the nonrequesting spouse for the nonrequesting 
spouse’s benefit, the Service will consider granting equitable relief 
although the underpayment may be attributable in part or in full to an item 
of the requesting spouse. The Service will consider relief in this case only 
to the extent that the funds intended for the payment of tax were taken by 
the nonrequesting spouse. 
. . . 
 
Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296 (emphasis added). 
 John contends he meets condition 7(b) of section 4.01 because he owned the 
understated income only nominally. Condition (7)(b) gives an example illustrating 
“nominal ownership,” whereby a spouse will not be held jointly and severally liable for 
underpaid taxes: When a husband, unbeknownst to his wife, 1) opens an individual 
retirement account (IRA) in his wife’s name by forging her signature, 2) contributes to 
the IRA, 3) takes a taxable distribution from the IRA, and finally 4) files a joint tax return 
with his wife without reporting the taxable distribution. 
                                                                                                                                                             
that this court reviews for clear error.” Cheshire v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 326, 332 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
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 John does not resemble the innocent wife of the IRS’s nominal ownership 
scenario. The parties stipulated the Maludas’ income came almost exclusively from 
John’s business and was held jointly by John and Cathy. While John claims Cathy 
“handled all financial matters” for the household, the record does not clearly support that 
conclusory assertion. Furthermore, even if Cathy did exercise exclusive control over the 
income, John voluntarily acceded to Cathy’s controlling the Maludas’ income. “[I]ncome 
earned by one person is taxable as his, if given to another for the donor’s satisfaction.” 
Thomas Flexible Coupling Co. v. Comm’r, 158 F.2d 828, 832 (3d Cir. 1947). 
Accordingly, John cannot deny ownership of income because his wife controlled the 
family finances while he earned the income. The Tax Court did not clearly err in 
concluding the record “does not establish . . . that [John Maluda’s] earnings from his sole 
proprietorship are not attributable to himself.” 
 John also contends he meets condition 7(c) of section 4.01 because he alleges 
Cathy produced false tax returns and misappropriated funds earmarked for tax payments. 
John insists he did not know of Cathy’s misdeeds, nor could he have known. Again, the 
record does not clearly support these conclusions. The stipulated facts demonstrate only 
that the Maludas’ joint tax returns between 1998 and 2002 were never filed with the IRS, 
and the Valley National Bank passbook in the Maludas’ name is a complete fabrication. 
John maintains Cathy is responsible for these transgressions. However, the record 
identifies no actor responsible for any misrepresentations or misappropriations. The 
parties never agreed, nor does the documentary record clearly demonstrate, that Cathy 
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bore sole responsibility for underreporting income to the IRS or diverted funds to her 
own use.  
 Even if Cathy did misrepresent the couple’s income, John presents no evidence 
she acted without his knowledge. Had the Tax Court conducted a trial, John might have 
demonstrated Cathy’s culpability and his own innocence. Because the parties submitted 
the case on the basis of a stipulated record, John had no such opportunity. Therefore, the 
court did not clearly err in concluding the record “does not establish that Ms. Maluda 
misappropriated funds intended for tax payments.” 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Tax Court’s judgment. 
